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A significant portion of the United States work force possesses some
measure of job security. In the private sector, many union contracts
provide that an employee may not be fired or otherwise disciplined except
for just cause. In the event of a contested disciplinary action, a neutral
arbitrator typically decides whether the employer's action was justified.'
The arbitrator often has the power to lessen the penalty and to fashion
other appropriate remedies such as reinstatement, back pay, or a com-
bination thereof.2
It has been suggested that the protection offered by such contracts is
not always satisfactory.' Where an employee has been wrongfully dis-
charged, it is typically his union-and not the wrongfully discharged
employee-that is empowered to prosecute the grievance. Furthermore,
the interests of the union and the employee may not coincide, 4 or there
may be legitimate differences of opinion between them with respect to the
merits of the dismissal. In either case, the wrongfully-discharged em-
ployee often receives less than the protection to which he is arguably
entitled. Moreover, only about twenty-five percent of the work force is
unionized,' and not all union members are protected by job security pro-
visions. Nevertheless, the common law rule permitting firing at will has
been made inapplicable to a significant number of private-sector employees.
In the public sector, state and federal statutes grant a degree of job
security to most governmental employees. On the federal level, the Civil
Service statute guarantees that a "permanent" employee will be notified
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Professor Lanzarone
received his B.A. and LL.B. degrees from Fordham University, and his LL.M. degree from
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1. Tobias, A Plea for the Wrongfully Discharged Employee Abandoned by His Union,
41 U. Cin. L. Rev. 55 & n.1 (1972).
2. Id. at 57.
3. See id. at 60-62.
4. See generally L. Sayles & G. Straus, The Local Union 40-47 (rev. ed. 1967).
5. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1973, at 250,
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of the reasons for his dismissal and will be given some opportunity to
reply in writing to the charges.6 Civil Service Commission regulations,
which apply to removals, suspensions, furloughs without pay, and re-
ductions in rank or pay,7 provide that adverse action may not be taken
against such an employee except to "promote the efficiency of the
service;" 8 and the regulations specifically forbid actions based on marital
status, political beliefs, race, color, creed, sex, or national origin Not all
federal employees are "permanent," however, and the statute and regula-
tions specifically recognize the existence of a probationary period during
which various procedural protections do not apply. 0
Similar state statutes" also recognize the existence of a probationary
period during which the statutory protections are not applicable. In many
jurisdictions special statutes govern the teaching profession. They typi-
cally provide that a teacher who has successfully completed a proba-
tionary period obtains tenure and may not be terminated except for cause
and then only after a hearing.1- In this respect they are not unlike the
general civil service laws.
In recent years, the job security protection enjoyed by public school
teachers has been increasingly questioned. The Scranton Report, issued
in 1970, called for a reconsideration of tenure for the purpose of im-
proving teaching. 3 In 1971 the Newman Report recommended a revision
6. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-33 (1970). In most cases, the statutes do not require any adversary
hearing although "[elxamination of witnesses, trial or hearing ...may be provided in the
discretion of the individual directing the removal or suspension without pay." Id. § 7501(b).
In some cases, a hearing is required. Id. § 7532(c) (3) (C). See generally American Fed'n
of Gov't Employees v. Acree, 475 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1973); McGhee v. Johnson, 420 F2d
445, 446 n.1 (10th Cir. 1969).
7. 5 C.F.R. § 752.101 (1973).
8. Id. § 752.104(a).
9. Id. § 752.104(b)-(c).
10. Id. §§ 752.103, 315.801 et seq. Even the probationary employee is entitled to learn
the reasons for which he is being dismissed, id. § 315.804, and can appeal to the Civil Service
Commission a termination which he believes was based on discrimation because of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, marital status, or political attitudes. Id. § 315.06(b).
See generally Jaeger v. Freeman, 410 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1969); W'lliams v. United States,
434 F.2d 1346 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
11. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 75 (McKinney 1973); 4 N.Y.C.R.R. § 4.5 (1969).
12. E.g., Cal. Educ. Code § 13315.1 (West 1969) (probationary period of three years);
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 10-151(b) (1967) (three years); I11. Ann. Stat. ch. 122, § 24-11
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973) (two years; can be extended); Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 13.102
(1972) (three years; can be extended).
13. Sherman, What Is Tenure? A Critical Explanation 5 (1973) (citing Report of the
President's Commission on Campus Unrest at 13,201 (1970)).
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in higher education tenure policies.' That same year, the New York
legislature abolished tenure for principals, assistant principals, and all
other supervisory personnel."5 More significantly, that legislature also
lengthened the probationary period from three to five years.1
A current American Federation of Teachers publication notes:
[T]here is a new strength in the attack against tenure today. It is an attack against
tenure itself and not simply against a few teachers. . . Tenure is marked, at one
time or another, as the cause of most of what is wrong with education and, by impli-
cation, society.' 7
It is not too difficult to find reasons for opposition to the tenure system.
Many parents (who are also voters) have undoubtedly dealt with teachers
whom they considered incompetent. They have been told, with some jus-
tification, that the tenure statutes make it impossible to rid a school sys-
tem of such employees. Moreover, if those teachers have sufficient seniority
and advanced degrees, they can earn in excess of $15,000 for less than
ten months' work.'" Such salaries, which are often higher than those of
the taxpayer-voter, constitute a significant percentage of the total expense
of running a school district. Given the rise in school taxes, increased
teacher militancy, and various unsettling reports with respect to the
schools, it is perhaps understandable that legislators, school boards, and
taxpayers are amenable to changes in a system which arguably permits
incompetent personnel to hold an easy job at an ever-increasing salary.
This article will examine the legal status of both the probationary and
tenured teacher and will make various recommendations for change.19 In
general, the author has concluded that the probationary teacher is alto-
gether too vulnerable to arbitrary action by the employer; and for that
reason alone, the job security protection of tenure, albeit with certain
changes, is necessary.
14. Id. (citing U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, Report on Higher Educa-
tion at 100 (1971)).
15. Law of Apr. 9, 1971, ch. 116, § 1, [1971] N.Y. Laws 194th Sess. 691 (codified at
N.Y. Educ. Law § 3012(1) (b) (McKinney Supp. 1973)).
16. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3012(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
17. Sherman, supra note 13 at 3. See N.Y. Teacher, June 17, 1973, at 5, col. 1. The April
1973 Legislative Bulletin of the New York State School Boards Association listed renewable
tenure (a new tenure determination to be made every five years) as a priority legislative
item. Id. at 16, col. 2. Similar lobbying efforts have occurred in Colorado, Illinois, and
Wisconsin. Id., July 1973, at 25, col. 3.
18. See, e.g., the current New York City salary schedule, 168 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 15, 1972, at
4, cols. 5-6.
19. For other discussions of proposed changes, and a view of the problem generally, see
Van Aistyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 Duke L.J. 841,




II. BACKGROND-THE PROBLEM IN GENERAL
Absent contractual or statutory provisions to the contrary, an employer
may discharge an employee at will.-° Regardless of the length of prior
employment, an employee acquires no inherent right to future employ-
ment. Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. 21 affords an example
of the unjust results that can follow.
Plaintiff had been employed by the company for over twenty-eight
years when he was taken ill. In an action for breach of implied contract,
he alleged that the employer's physician negligently and incorrectly had
informed the company that he was fit to return to work and that an agent
of the employer mistakenly had told the company that he had voluntarily
terminated his employment rather than work again. The court ruled that
the company could discharge plaintiff because the employer-employee re-
lationship "is terminable at the will of either party."22 It found that
neither plaintiff's long-term employment, nor his consequent unsuitability
for employment elsewhere, nor the circumstances of his dismissal created
a duty on the part of the employer.23
A public school teacher admittedly is not as vulnerable as the plaintiff
in Pearson. Most jurisdictions grant statutory tenure to teachers within
five yearsY4 Further, even a probationary teacher may be somewhat less
vulnerable to arbitrary action than his counterpart in the private sector.'
It should be noted, however, that a teacher who is not granted tenure at
the end of a five-year probationary period is at a serious disadvantage in
today's job market. His failure to obtain tenure will in itself raise ques-
tions. Moreover, in a period of teacher surplus and taxpayer pressure to
cut costs, he will be competing with many less experienced and hence
lower salaried individuals.
II. THE PROBATIONARY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE-
THE CASE LAW-PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The loyalty cases of the 1950s resulted in a large number of decisions
dealing with the employment rights of government employees. One of the
20. 53 Am. Jur. 2d Master and Servant § 34 (1970); 56 C.J.S. Master and Servant
§ 61 (1948). See generally Weyand, Present Status of Individual Employee Rights, in Pro-
ceedings of NYU Twenty-Second Annual Conference on Labor 171, 174-75 (1970).
21. 332 F.2d 439 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 914 (1964). See also Steelworkers Local
1617 v. General Fireproofing Co., 464 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1972).
22. 332 F.2d at 441.
23. Id.
24. See sources cited in note 12 supra.
25. For example, many jurisdictions provide that a probationary teacher cannot be fired
during the school year except for cause. See the sources cited in note 125 infra.
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earliest, Bailey v. Richardson,26 involved the dismissal of a temporary
civil service employee under a Civil Service Commission regulation which
authorized such action if" '[o]n all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist
for belief that the person involved is disloyal to the Government of the
United States.' "27 Plaintiff Bailey was charged with membership in the
Communist Party, association with Communist Party members, and mem-
bership in various other suspect organizations. After an administrative
hearing at which she was denied the rights to learn the identity of her
accusers or to cross-examine them, she was dismissed from her job and
and barred from taking civil service examinations for three years. The
court, in refusing to order her reinstatement, observed that Bailey was
not constitutionally entitled to a quasi-judicial hearing before dismissal
and that a government job was not "property" within the meaning of the
fifth amendment."8
In his dissent, Judge Edgerton agreed that nonpunitive executive dis-
missals did not require a hearing.2" On the other hand, he reasoned that
dismissal for disloyalty was a punishment which, under the due process
clause, could not be imposed unless the accused employee were afforded
the safeguards of a judicial trial.3 0
Bailey involved the dismissal of a government employee pursuant to
an executive order authorizing dismissals from government service be-
cause of disloyalty.3 ' While such dismissals were before the Supreme
Court on numerous occasions during the decade, the Court's constitutional
views with respect to the program were never clearly set forth. For ex-
ample, in Peters v. Hobby,3" the Court merely ruled that petitioner's
dismissal from government service was contrary to the provisions of the
applicable executive order.3" Only Justice Douglas raised the argument
that it was unconstitutional to dismiss the petitioner without giving him
an opportunity to confront his accusers.3 4
In New York, a probationary teacher is entitled to 30 days' notice prior to dismissal. N.Y.
Educ. Law § 3019-a (McKinney 1970).
26. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
The Bailey decision was questioned by the Supreme Court in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 571 & n.9 (1972).
27. 182 F.2d at 49 (quoting Reg. 2.104, 12 Fed. Reg. 2832 (1947), as amended, 13 Fed.
Reg. 1978 (Apr. 13, 1948), 5 C.F.R. § 2.104 (1949)). Similar provisions currently exist in
5 C.F.R. § 731.201(f) (1973).
28. 182 F.2d at 57.
29. Id. at 69 (Edgerton, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 69-71.
31. Id. at 49 (majority opinion).
32. 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
33. Id. at 347-48.
34. Id. at 350-52 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Black also stated he would have pre-
ferred to decide the case on the basis of the constitutional issue raised by Justice Douglas,
[Vol. 42
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Tacit recognition that employment was constitutionally protected came,
not in a case involving public employment, but rather in a case arising in
the private sector. In Greene v. McElroy,35 plaintiff had been discharged
from his job with a defense contractor after the government revoked his
security clearance in a proceeding in which he had no opportunity to con-
front and cross-examine the persons whose statements reflected adversely
on his loyalty. Chief Justice Warren phrased the precise issue in Greene as:
[whether the Defense Department was] authorized to create an industrial security
clearance program under which affected persons may lose their jobs and may be re-
strained in following their chosen professions on the basis of fact determinations con-
cerning their fitness for clearance made in proceedings in which they are denied the
traditional procedural safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination. 0
The Court found no such specific authorization and held that the Defense
Department officials "were not empowered to deprive petitioner of his
job in a proceeding in which he was not afforded the safeguards of con-
frontation and cross-examination.1 37 Because the Court found that the
Defense Department lacked statutory authority to act as it had,38 it did
not decide the constitutionality of the specific procedures; nonetheless,
the Court seemed to recognize that, even in the private sector, the due
process clause of the fifth amendment constitutionally protects employ-
ment against unreasonable federal governmental action. Specifically, the
Court pointed out that the right to hold given private employment and to
follow one's chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental inter-
ference comes within the liberty and property concepts of the fifth amend-
ment.39
While the Court limited its precise holding, several of its statements
had constitutional implications. The Chief Justice wrote as follows:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of
these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the rea-
sonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the
Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity
to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the case of documentary evidence,
it is even more important where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals
whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated
by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. We have formalized these
protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination. They have
ancient roots. They find expression in the Sixth Amendment .... This Court has been
zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal
but did not express an opinion thereon. Id. at 349-50 (Black, J., concurring).
35. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
36. Id. at 493.
37. Id. at 508.
38. Id. at 500-05, 50S.
39. See id. at 506-08.
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cases . . . but also in all types of cases where administrative . . . actions were under
scrutiny.40
Such a principle is, of course, not inconsistent with the proposition that
under certain circumstances the interest of a government employee in
retaining his job may be summarily denied. For example, in Vitarelli v.
Seaton,4 the Court required the government to conform to procedural
standards established for loyalty cases by regulations promulgated pur-
suant to an executive order.2 Nevertheless, it specifically recognized the
government's power summarily to discharge probationary employees
"without the giving of any reason."48
In June, 1972, the Supreme Court decided two cases4 involving the
constitutional status of probationary teachers.45 In Board of Regents v.
Rott,,41 the respondent, who had been hired to teach at a state university
for a fixed term of one academic year, alleged that the board of regents
had denied him procedural due process by its summary decision not to
rehire him. The district court granted Roth summary judgment and the
court of appeals affirmed, holding that the fourteenth amendment required
university officials to inform him of the reason for nonretention and to
grant him a hearing.47
40. Id. at 496-97 (citations and footnote omitted). See K. Davis, Administrative Law
§ 7.04 (3d ed. 1972).
41. 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
42. Id. at 539-40.
43. Id. at 539. See Jaeger v. Freeman, 410 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1969) ; cf. Jones v. Hopper,
410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970) (Civil Rights Act case).
44. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), noted in 41 Fordham L. Rev. 684
(1973) ; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
45. A host of prior cases dealt with the procedural rights of probationary teachers whose
employment had been terminated. Some courts held that no prior hearing was required nor
was the employer required to inform the teacher of the reasons for its action. E.g., Orr v.
Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972) ; Thaw v. Board of
Pub. Instruc., 432 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1970); cf. Robles v. El Paso Commun. Action Agency,
Project Bravo, Inc., 456 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1972). Other courts held that a written explana-
tion of the reasons for nonretention must be given, but no hearing was required. E.g., Drown
v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971) ;
cf. Thomas v. Kirkwood Commun. College, 448 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1971). Finally, certain
courts concluded that a probationary teacher was entitled both to the delineation of the
reasons for his nonretention and to a hearing to contest those reasons. See, e.g., Shirck v.
Thomas, 447 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1971), vacated for reconsideration in light of Roth, 408
U.S. 940 (1972) ; Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S.
564 (1972); Lucas v. Chapman, 430 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1970) (hearing before board re-
quired where teacher claims failure to rehire was due to exercise of first amendment rights,
but no hearing required "where the only matter in issue is a difference of view over a school
board's exercise of judgment and discretion concerning matters non-constitutional in na-
ture. . . ." Id. at 947).
46. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
47. Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970), aft'd, 446 F.2d 806
(7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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In reversing, the Supreme Court noted that state law "leaves the de-
cision whether to rehire a nontenured teacher for another year to the
unfettered discretion of university officials"4 and held that respondent
had no constitutional right "to a statement of reasons and a hearing on
the University's decision not to rehire him for another year."49
The Court reasoned that the requirements of procedural due process
"apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection of liberty and property."5 0 The majority con-
ceded "that the property interests protected by procedural due process
extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.""
It noted that property rights as such are not created by the Constitution
but arise from independent sources such as state law or other existing
rules or understandings.52 For example, in Goldberg v. Kelly,O persons
receiving welfare benefits had a continuing right under the applicable
statutes to receive such benefits, and this right was safeguarded by pro-
cedural due process. Likewise, tenured teachers, professors dismissed
during the terms of their contracts, and even teachers hired "without
tenure or a formal contract, but nonetheless with a clearly implied
promise of continued employment," have "interests in continued employ-
ment that are safeguarded by due process." 4 But respondent Roth was
unable to demonstrate any such interest. His "property" interest was
created and defined by the terms of his appointment, which terminated
at the end of the academic year and made no provision for renewal. In
addition, no state statute or university rule created any legitimate claim
to re-employment. The Court concluded that "respondent surely had an
abstract concern in being rehired, but he did not have a property interest
sufficient to require the University authorities to give him a hearing when
they declined to renew his contract of employment."" In short, there was
no property interest to which the fourteenth amendment's procedural pro-
tections could be applied.
In Perry v. Sindermann,8 the Court was faced with a harder case.
Respondent Sindermann had taught in the Texas state college system for
over ten years. During the 1968-69 academic year, he was elected pres-
ident of the Texas Junior College Teachers Association and immediately
48. 408 U.S. at 567.
49. Id. at 569.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 571-72.
52. Id. at 577.
53. 397 U.S. 254 (1970), cited by the Roth Court in 408 US. at 576.
54. 408 U.S. at 577 (citing Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971); Slochower
v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); and Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)).
55. Id. at 578 (emphasis in original).
56. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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became involved in public disagreements with the policies of his college's
board of regents, which decided not to renew his contract for the next
academic year. In a press release in 1969 and in the court proceedings,
petitioners claimed that Sindermann had been guilty of insubordination in
defying his superiors by attending legislative committee meetings even
though college officials had refused to permit him to leave his classes for
such a purpose. The district court, which granted summary judgment for
petitioners, concluded that respondent had not stated a cause of action
since his employment contract expired on May 31, 1969, and the college
in which he taught had not adopted the tenure system., 7 The court of
appeals reversed, 8 holding that failure to allow respondent the opportu-
nity for a hearing would violate the constitutional guarantee of procedural
due process if respondent could show that he had an "expectancy" of re-
employment. The Supreme Court agreed.
[T]he Constitution does not require opportunity for a hearing before the nonrenewal
of a nontenured teacher's contract, unless he can show that the decision not to rehire
him somehow deprived him of an interest in "liberty" or that he had a "property"
interest in continued employment, despite the lack of tenure or a formal contract.59
The Court ruled that respondent's allegations raised a question of fact as
to whether he possessed such an interest in continued employment, and
that he was entitled to show at trial that he had such a "property" interest.
His longer length of service and certain rules of his college distinguished
his situation from that of the teacher in Rothc0 and may have given him
the equivalent of statutory tenure.61
The net effect of the Roth and Sindermann decisions is to reaffirm the
government's right to fire a nontenured employee without affording a
hearing at which he may contest the action, unless he is protected by
contract or unless the employee can demonstrate specific circumstances
which give him some legitimate interest in continued employment, i.e.,
an interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. In Roth, there were
no such circumstances. 2 In Sindermann, the Court concluded there may
have been:
A teacher, like the respondent, who has held his position for a number of years,
might be able to show from the circumstances of this service--and from other relevant
57. Id. at 596. The district court opinion is not officially reported.
58. Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 945 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
59. 408 U.S. at 599.
60. Id. at 599-603.
61. The Odessa College Rules provided: "'Odessa College has no tenure system. The
Administration of the College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent tenure
as long as his teaching services are satisfactory and as long as he displays a cooperative
attitude toward his co-workers and his superiors, and as long as he is happy in his work."'
Id. at 600. See id. at 600 n.6; Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1970).
62. See text accompanying notes 46-55 supra.
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facts-that he has a legitimate claim of entitlement to job tenure. Just as this Court
has found there to be a "common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant"
... so there may be an unwritten "common law" in a particular university that certain
employees shall have the equivalent of tenure. This is particularly likely in a college
or university. .. that has no explicit tenure system even for senior members of its
faculty, but that nonetheless may have created such a system in practice.0
IV. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND
DEPRIVATION Or LIBERTY
The Roth decision also recognized that the procedural due process re-
quirements of the fourteenth amendment apply to deprivations of liberty"
and that absent special circumstances, "the right to some kind of prior
hearing is paramount." 6 The Court noted that the liberty guaranteed by
the amendment denotes "not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual to . . . engage in any of the common
occupations of life . . ... " It agreed that "[t]here might be cases in
which a State refused to re-employ a person under such circumstances
that interests in liberty would be implicated," 7 as for example where the
state said it was refusing to rehire because the employee had been guilty
of dishonesty or immorality: "For '[w]here a person's good name, repu-
tation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is
doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.' "S
The Court pointed out that the state had made no charge that would dam-
age Roth's standing in the community. Had it done so, "due process
would accord an opportunity to refute the charge before University offi-
cials,"69 but in fact there was "no suggestion whatever that the respon-
dent's interest in his 'good name, reputation, honor, or integrity' [was] at
stake.)70
A teacher dismissed for alleged theft of school funds, therefore, would
be entitled to a hearing to contest such a charge. But the factual situation
does not always produce so obvious a conclusion.71 Moreover, it is the
employer who decides in the first instance whether the reasons for dismis-
sal require a prior due process hearing, and "[tlhe purpose of such no-
63. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 602 (citation omitted).
64. 408 U.S. at 569; accord, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 US. at 599.
65. 408 U.S. at 569-70.
66. Id. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
67. Id- at 573.
68. Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)). See McNeill v.
Butz, 480 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1973).
69. 408 U.S. at 573 (footnote omitted).
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., No. 73-1535 (7th Cir., Feb. 5,




tice and hearing is to provide the person an opportunity to clear his name.
Once a person has cleared his name at a hearing, his employer, of course,
may remain free to deny him future employment for other reasons. ' )2
At least one court has argued that dismissal for incompetency involves
a teacher's "reputation and good name as a teacher, which comes within
the concept of liberty as expressed in the Roth case. '173 However, the de-
cisions cited by the Roth Court did not involve the employee's compe-
tence as a capable worker; rather, they involved personal honor, integrity
and reputation. 4
The Roth Court also recognized that foreclosing one from his chosen
occupation may amount to a deprivation of liberty, but concluded that
"[m]ere proof ... that [a teacher's] record of nonretention in one job,
taken alone, might make him somewhat less attractive to some other em-
ployers would hardly establish the kind of foreclosure of opportunities
amounting to a deprivation of 'liberty.' ,1 This conclusion is persuasive
in theory, but in practice the situation may not be quite so simple. One
of the first acts of a subsequent potential employer will be to ask the
former employer the reasons for the earlier termination. Even if these
reasons do not reflect upon the teacher's character, they may shed suffi-
cient doubt upon his competence as a teacher as to make it very difficult
for him to obtain another teaching position.
Several court opinions since Roth have suggested that a definitive eval-
uation resulting in a finding of professional incompetence would consti-
tute a disability sufficient to require a due process hearing,70 but the case
72. 408 U.S. at 573 n.12.
73. Aster v. Board of Educ., 72 Misc. 2d 953, 957, 339 N.Y.S.2d 903, 907 (Sup. Ct.
1972). See Suarez v. Weaver, 484 F.2d 678, 680 & n.1 (7th Cir. 1973).
74. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). Many of the pro-Roth
decisions are discussed in Jacobsen, Sperry & Jensen, The Dismissal and Non-Reemployment
of Teachers, 1 J. Law & Educ. 435, 439-45 (1972).
75. 408 U.S. at 574 n.13 (emphasis added). The decision in Greene v. McElroy, discussed
at notes 35-40 supra and accompanying text, may have turned on the fact that the govern-
ment's action made it impossible for Greene to pursue his chosen profession. 360 U.S. at
475-76, 508.
See De Vaughn, Termination and Due Process-A Comment, 2 J. Law & Educ. 305 (1973),
which raises the pertinent question: "Why should a personnel officer recommend [a teacher]
with such unanswered questions as why [he] was nonrenewed when other well-qualified per-
sonnel are available without a cloud?" Id. at 308 n.10. Similarly, another commentator has
made the relevant observation: "There can be no doubt that a teacher's professional reputa-
tion is damaged by nonrenewal, and it may well bring an end to his professional career."
1971 Wis. L. Rev. 354, 358.
76. Cases that support the requirement of a hearing include Lipp v. Board of Educ., 470
F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1972) (dictum); Wilderman v. Nelson, 467 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1972)
(state welfare caseworker); Carpenter v. City of Greenfield School Dist., 358 F. Supp. 220
(E.D. Wis. 1973); Whitney v. Board of Regents, 355 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
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law is by no means conclusive.77 It may stretch "the concept too far to
suggest that a person is deprived of 'liberty' when he simply is not re-
hired in one job but remains as free as before to seek another.""' The
conclusion is not quite so patent, however, where nonretention results
from definitive evaluation of professional incompetence.
If the reasons for nonretention are sufficiently definitive, the teacher
may find it virtually impossible to pursue his chosen profession. In such a
case, the due process clause should apply, even though the teacher's per-
sonal honor or integrity is not questioned.
A teacher dismissed for professional incompetence is especially vul-
nerable at the present time. The scarcity of teaching jobs is only one part
of the picture.79 A second--and perhaps more important-fact is that a
teacher with more experience and more education is more expensiveY0
Given the already-strained tax situations in most school districts, it is
simply good business to hire the recent graduate rather than the teacher
with four years experience and several credits beyond a bachelor's degree.
The difference in salary alone can amount to approximately $2,000
annually.
V. TH LICENSING CASES
The recent Supreme Court decisions in Roth and Sindermann are to
some extent inconsistent with the rulings in various cases involving the
77. For cases which have not ordered a hearing in similar situations see Jablon v.
Trustees of the Cal. State Colleges, 482 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1973) ; Jenkins v. United States
Post Office, 475 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 US. 866 (1973); Canty v. Board of
Educ., 470 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 US. 907 (1973); Russell v. Hodges,
470 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1972).
78. 408 U.S. at 575.
79. See N.Y. Teacher, June 3, 1973, at 33, cols. 3-4, citing federal government reports
predicting a teacher surplus of one million between 1970-75 and a possible teacher shortage
in the following decade. See also id., Feb. 3, 1974, at 1, cols. 1-4, noting the disappearance
of approximately 4,500 teaching positions in New York City during the past few years. In
1973-74, enrollment in New York State's public and private elementary and secondary
schools declined slightly for the third consecutive year. Id., Sept. 16, 1973, at 15, col. 1. In
discussing teacher unemployment, it should be noted that districts are not required to pro-
vide unemployment insurance for teachers. In this respect, the teacher is in a disadvantageous
position when compared to employees in the private sector. Legislation has been introduced
to require public school districts to provide unemployment compensation. N.Y. Sen. bill
1698-A & N.Y. Assembly bill 4723, 196th Sess. (1973).
S0. Based on receipt of approximately 285 contracts, the New York State United Teachers
Research Division estimated that the 1973-74 median salary of a beginning teacher in New
York State was $8,000. The figure rises to $10,040 for a teacher with a master's degree
entering his fourth year of teaching. N.Y. Teacher, Oct. 14, 1973, at 11. Given the rules for
teacher certification, all teachers will have a substantial number of graduate credits within
five years and most will have a master's degree. See note 128 infra and accompanying text.
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grant or revocation of a license to practice a given profession. While some
older decisions hold that a license is a privilege which may be revoked
without notice or hearing,"' the better-reasoned decisions discussed below
recognize that license revocation may require a hearing with various pro-
cedural safeguards to enable the licensee to contest the proposed revoca-
tion, depending on the reason for which the license is revoked. The li-
censing cases have in fact recognized the applicability of the due process
clause, not only with respect to revocation, but also with respect to the
initial application for a license.
In Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals,"2 plaintiff brought
suit to compel the board to enroll him as an attorney entitled to practice
before the board. A rule permitted the board to deny admission at its
discretion. The Supreme Court reasoned that "this must be construed to
mean the exercise of a discretion to be exercised after fair investigation,
with such a notice, hearing and opportunity to answer for the applicant
as would constitute due process."'8 3 Goldsmith did not hold that an appli-
cant for a license is always entitled to a trial-type hearing; but where
refusal to license is due to alleged unfitness, the Court ruled that plaintiff
was entitled to notice of the charges and a hearing to answer them.
In Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness,84 which involved
the refusal of the New York courts to admit petitioner to the bar, the
Supreme Court pointed out that procedural due process requires that the
petitioner be given notice of the reasons for the refusal to admit him. The
Court further required that a hearing be held and, although it did not lay
down the procedural safeguards required at the hearing, it did point out
"that procedural due process often requires confrontation and cross-
examination of those whose word deprives a person of his livelihood." 8
Perhaps the basic rationale of the licensing cases was best set forth in
Hornsby v. Allen:8 6
A governmental agency entrusted with the licensing power ... functions as a legislature
when it prescribes these standards, but the same agency acts as a judicial body when it
makes a determination that a specific applicant has or has not satisfied them.8 7
The New York courts have recognized that when the revocation of a
license depends on the existence of facts regarding the licensee, due
81. E.g., Stone v. Fritts, 169 Ind. 361, 82 N.E. 792 (1907); Marrs v. Mathews, 270 S.W.
586 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1925) ; see 68 Am. Jur. 2d Schools § 132 (1973). But cf. the discus-
sion in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
82. 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
83. Id. at 123.
84. 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
85. Id. at 103.
86. 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
87. Id. at 608.
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process requires the holding of a hearing. In Hecht v. Monaghan,"s peti-
tioner's hack license had been revoked after he was brought before a New
York City police captain and charged with refusal to return change to a
passenger. The New York City Administrative Code which empowered
the police department to issue and revoke such licenses had no provi-
sions requiring a hearing. Since the revocation depended on the truth of
certain factual allegations which would constitute violations of the Code
if true, and since petitioner was not in any way a member of the agency
that granted or revoked the licenses, the court of appeals ruled that the
agency was acting in a quasi-judicial fashion; hence, petitioner should be
fully informed of both the charges and the evidence against him and be
given the opportunity to cross-examine opposing witnesses, inspect docu-
ments, and offer rebuttal. Absent these safeguards and any other essen-
tial element of a fair trial, petitioner's license could not be revoked.
A series of cases involving the New York City Board of Education
demonstrates the distinction made by the courts between revocation of a
license and loss of a particular job. In New York it is settled that a
probationary teacher may be dismissed without a hearing.89 In addition,
a specific by-law of the city Board has long provided that a teacher's
license would terminate "[i]f and when the service of the licensee is
terminated by discontinuance of probationary appointment or by dismis-
sal.")90 Prior to decentralization, this rule was no departure from the
cases previously discussed, since the licensor and the employer were the
same and the by-law could be viewed simply as a declaration that the
employer would not rehire a teacher who had been dismissed. The effect
of the rule was softened by the existence of a procedure which gave pro-
bationary teachers certain due process rights which were not constitu-
tionally or statutorily required.9 In addition, as at least one court pointed
out:
[The city license] is not authorization to engage in the teaching profession. Without it
one can still teach in any non-public school in or out of the City of New York. Nor is
it needed to teach in any public school out of New York [City]*02
This is true because the so-called city license issued by the Chancellor of
the New York City School District was a requirement over and above the
88. 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d 421 (1954).
89. E.g., Butler v. Allen, 29 App. Div. 2d 799, 287 N.YS.2d 197 (3d Dep't 1968) (mem.);
Pinto v. Wynstra, 22 App. Div. 2d 914, 255 N.Y.S.2d 536 (2d Dep't 1964) (mern.) and cases
cited. A recent statute, applicable to all boards of education except those in New York City,
permits a teacher to learn the reasons for his dismissal. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3031 (McKinney
Supp. 1973).
90. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ. By-Laws § 241(g) (1964).
91. Id. § 105(a).
92. Zw~lenberg v. Scribner, No. 71-13,299 (Sup. Ct. Kings County, Oct. 20, 1971), at 3.
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state teaching certificate issued by the State Commissioner of Education;
it was the latter certificate which made one eligible to seek employment in
the public school districts outside New York City.
The passage of the decentralization law, which permitted the New York
City Board of Education to divide the city into thirty-one separate com-
munity school districts, changed the legal situation. Shortly thereafter
the State Commissioner of Education held that the above mentioned by-
laws did not provide sufficient procedural protection to justify cancella-
tion of a city teaching license where dismissal of a probationary teacher
pursuant to by-law 105 also resulted in termination of the city license.
The Commissioner reasoned:
Prior to the enactment of the decentralization statute and the creation of 31 com-
munity school districts as semi-autonomous units of the New York City school sys-
tem, employment and licensure in that system were, for all practical purposes, synony-
mous. Termination of employment left the existence of such a license a hollow form,
without any legal substance. Since the enactment of [the decentralization law], how-
ever, where a teacher is dismissed from employment by one of these 31 community
districts, he may be re-employed by any of the other 30 such districts, provided he
holds a license. The license, therefore, is now a valuable property right and is entitled,
as such, to the protection set forth in the decision in Hecht v. Monaghan and its
progeny.94
Thus, the passage of the decentralization law has changed the legal sig-
nificance of the city license. No longer can the city Board decide that, as
a general policy, a probationary teacher whose employment is terminated
by one of the community school boards will lose his city license which
may assist him in obtaining employment in the other districts of the city.
Deprivation of a license precludes an individual from seeking employment
in a specific job market. In certain situations, loss of a particular job
can have the same effect. In such cases, there should be no difference in
the procedural due process protections that are afforded.
VI. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Certain grounds for the dismissal of a probationary teacher may be
precluded because they involve the deprivation of specific constitutional
or statutory rights. These include dismissals because of union activity,9 5
93. N.Y. Educ. Law § 2590-b(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
94. Matter of Baronat, 11 N.Y. Educ. Dep't Rep. 150, 153 (1972). The reasoning was
specifically approved in Greenwald v. Community School Bd. No. 27, 69 Misc. 2d 238, 242,
329 N.Y.S.2d 203, 206 (Sup. Ct. 1972), modified mem., 42 App. Div. 2d 965, 347 N.Y.S.2d
969 (2d Dep't 1973).
95. McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); Tischler v. Board of Educ.,
37 App. Div. 2d 261, 323 N.Y.S.2d 508 (2d Dep't 1971).
In New York, the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) may determine whether
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age,96 sex, race,97 or the proper exercise of various constitutional rights."
In both Roth and Sindermann, the Court recognized that the government
may not deny employment to a person for reasons that infringe protected
interests. Lack of tenure or a contractual right to re-employment would
not, for example, defeat a claim that nonrenewal of a teacher's contract
violated his first and fourteenth amendment rights. "For if the govern-
ment could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally pro-
tected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in
effect be penalized and inhibited." 9 In this respect the Roth and Sinder-
mann decisions are consistent with an impressive array of prior cases
which voided employee dismissals on substantive constitutional grounds.
For example, Keyishian v. Board of Regents0 ' held that non-tenured
faculty at a state university could not be dismissed pursuant to New
York's anti-communist Feinberg Law,10' which was so vague and overly
broad as to "bar employment both for association which legitimately may
be proscribed and for association which may not be proscribed con-
sistently with First Amendment rights."'0 2 Similarly, in Wieman v. Upde-
graff, 0 3 the Court, in finding an Oklahoma loyalty oath invalid, pointed
out that "constitutional protection does extend to the public servant
whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discrimina-
tory."'104 In short, there are certain grounds upon which the government
a probationary teacher has been discharged in retaliation for union activity. Board of Educ.
v. Helsby, 37 App. Div. 2d 493, 326 N.YS.2d 452 (4th Dep't 1971), aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 660,
295 N.E.2d 797, 343 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1973) (mem.); Port Jervis City School Dist. v. New York
State PERB, 68 Misc. 2d 1065, 328 N.YS.2d 760 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
96. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1970).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (McKinney 1972).
98. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 568, 573-75 (1968); Hanover Twp. Fed'n of Teachers v. Hanover Commun. School
Corp., 457 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1972) ("[a] public employee is protected against discharge in
retaliation against the exercise of his constitutional rights . . . ." Id. at 460). See Long v.
Board of Educ., 456 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) ; Bergstein v. Board of Educ.,
42 App. Div. 2d 591, 344 N.Y.S.2d 732 (2d Dep't 1973) (mene.) (dictum).
99. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 597.
100. 385 US. 589 (1967).
101. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3022 (McKinney 1970).
102. 385 U.S. at 609.
103. 344U.S. 183 (1952).
104. Id. at 192. The Court noted that the state was "attempting to bar disloyal indi-
viduals from its employ, to exclude persons solely on the basis of organizational membership,
regardless of their knowledge concerning the organizations to which they had belonged."
Id. at 190. The Court also noted the "badge of infamy" that results from being fired because
of disloyalty to the government. Id. at 190-91. The oath thus involved deprivation of first
and fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at 191.
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may not base the dismissal of an employee from government service."'
The question which remains is whether the dismissal of a teacher for
trivial reasons not associated with the exercise of constitutional rights is
constitutionally permissible. This precise issue was before the Seventh
Circuit in Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consolidated School District.00 The
case concerned Dorothy Jeffries, a probationary teacher who lacked any
"claim of entitlement to the position which would qualify as a property
interest under the [Supreme] Court's reasoning in Roth and in [Sinder-
mann] .*..."1o1 Her employment was terminated for reasons which did
not constitute a deprivation of life or liberty within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment."" In addition, the termination was not motivated
by the exercise of any of her constitutional rights nor by any discrimina-
tory purpose."° Nevertheless, Mrs. Jeffries alleged that "the Board
decision was itself completely without basis in fact or logic, and argue [d]
that such an arbitrary and capricious action violate[d] her constitutional
right to 'substantive due process.' ,r1t
The court reasoned that in order for a plaintiff to have a substantive
due process claim the state action must deprive him of "life, liberty, or
property ... [without] a rational basis.""' The court found it unneces-
sary to decide whether the board's action had such a basis because
plaintiff had no property right in continued employment:
As Roth squarely holds, the right to procedural due process is applicable only to state
action which impairs a person's interest in either liberty or property. Certainly the con-
stitutional right to "substantive" due process is no greater than the right to procedural
due process. Accordingly, the absence of any claim by the plaintiff that an interest in
liberty or property has been impaired is a fatal defect in her substantive due process
argument."Y2
There are of course many legitimate grounds for the dismissal of a
probationary teacher which involve no deprivation of any constitutional
or statutory right and clearly have some relationship to the improvement
105. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 596-98. Accord, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
at 588 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See notes 95-98 supra and accompanying text.
106. No. 73-1535 (7th Cir., Feb. 5, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Slip op.].
107. Slip op. at 3. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Compare notes 46-55
supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the rights of a teacher who has an ex-
pectancy of continued employment.
108. Slip op. at 3. See notes 75-79 supra and accompanying text.
109. Slip op. at 3. See notes 95-98 supra and accompanying text.
110. Slip op. at 4.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 5. Accord, Crabtree v. Brennan, 466 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1972) (per curtam);
see Scheelhaase v. Woodbury Cent. Commun. School Dist., 488 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1973) ; cf.
Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 451 F.2d 1106 (1st Cir. 1970); Lucas v. Chapman, 430
F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1970).
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of the educational system." 3 The teacher may fail to maintain a proper
relationship with students, parents or fellow teachers. There may be a
failure to respond to the suggestions of a supervisor or to adapt to the
established methodology of the school district. There may be an absence
of professional growth-a failure to improve or advance professionally
through post-graduate education, membership in professional societies
and the like." 4 Any of the above faults could be sufficient to warrant dis-
missal of the probationary employee or make the employer unwilling to
grant tenure. Nevertheless, the nature of the judgments involved, the
possibility of abuse, and the difficulty of proving in a court that a stated
ground for dismissal was not the actual basis of the employer's action
raise the question of whether some change in the legal position of the
probationary teacher is not warranted.
Given the fact that there are grounds for dismissal upon which the
government may not act, the failure of the Supreme Court to require a
governmental employer to specify the actual reason for its action is diffi-
cult to understand. On this issue at least, the First Circuit's opinion
in Drown v. Portsmouth School District"5 is persuasive. Judge Coffin
there argued that a non-tenured teacher has "an interest in being rehired
sufficient to prevent the school district from not doing so for constitu-
tionally impermissible reasons,"" 0 and concluded that the probationary
teacher was entitled to learn the reasons for his nonretention.1 7 The
Supreme Court may have settled the constitutional question, but the wis-
dom of the result is questionable. However, there has been no suggestion
that this information cannot be obtained through the discovery process
once litigation involving the allegedly improperly dismissed plaintiff has
113. E.g., Fluker v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 441 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1971) (desire
of employer to improve quality of teaching staff). There may be procedural due-process im-
plications, however, if the termination results from a conclusive evaluation of the teacher's
professional competence. See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Chitwood v. Feaster, 468 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1972) (failure to follow in-
structions and to work cooperatively and harmoniously with superiors) ; Knarr v. Board of
School Trustees, 452 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1971) (lack of concern for punctuality, and en-
couraging students to violate school rules) ; Simcox v. Board of Educ., 443 F2d 40 (7th Cir.
1971) (failure to award tenure due to lack of self-direction and lack of cooperation with
administration in following prescribed procedures); Ewing v. Camacho, 441 F.2d 1142 (9th
Cir. 1971) (refusal to comply with supervisory decisions concerning course of study; un-
necessarily rude and abrasive attitude toward other faculty members). See note 191 infra
and accompanying text.
115. 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971).
116. Id. at 1183.
117. Id. at 1185. This is especially true since, "[f]rom the viewpoint of the school board,
a requirement that it state its reasons for not rehiring a non-tenured teacher would impose
no significant administrative burden." Id.
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begun, and several states currently require school boards to state their
reasons for not rehiring non-tenured personnel." 8 This requirement and
the ability of an employee to inspect materials such as supervisor's
evaluations would help prevent arbitrary actions against probationary
employees.
VII. THE PROBLEM IN NEw YORK
The New York experience with respect to the legal status of proba-
tionary teachers exemplifies many of the legal problems and inequities
in the system. As already noted, the New York legislature has lengthened
the probationary period to five years-one of the longest in the nation."'
That same legislature later enacted a statute requiring all school boards
outside New York City to inform non-tenured teachers of the reasons for
their dismissal. 2 ' Unions in New York, pursuant to the provisions of the
so-called Taylor Law,' 2' have attempted to improve the job security
status of both probationary and tenured employees by means of collec-
tive bargaining. In addition, numerous decisions both of the courts and of
New York's Commissioner of Education provide some basis for an eval-
uation of the tenure system. In short, given the interplay of the legis-
lative, administrative, and judicial activity, the New York experience may
provide a basis for evaluating the present status of the probationary
and tenured teacher and for recommending alternatives which might be
considered by the various state legislatures.
Section 3012 of the New York State Education Law sets out the pro-
cedure under which probationary teaching employees are accorded tenure
in most of the school districts in the state. 2 The law requires the service
of a probationary period, a favorable superintendent's recommendation,
and the grant of tenure by the board of education.2 3 The section specif-
ically provides that "[t]he service of a person ... may be discontinued at
any time during such probationary period, on the recommendation of the
superintendent of schools, by a majority vote of the board of educa-
tion;'" 24 in this respect, the New York law is harsher than most other
118. These states include California (Cal. Educ. Code § 13443(f) (West Supp. 1974)),
Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 10-151(a) (Supp. 1973)), Illinois (Ill. Ann. Stat.
ch. 122, § 24-11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973)), New York (N.Y. Educ. Law § 3031 (McKlnney
Supp. 1973)), and Texas (Tex. Educ. Code § 13.104 (1972)).
119. Compare N.Y. Educ. Law § 3012(1) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1973) with Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 122, § 24-11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973) (two school terms, extendible on certain
conditions).
120. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3031 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
121. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law §§ 200-14 (McKinney 1973).





states' laws which require "good cause" to dismiss a probationary teacher
during the school year.125 The only restrictions on the New York law
allowing summary dismissal of probationary teachers are the require-
ments that "[ejach person who is not to be recommended for appoint-
ment on tenure, shall be so notified by the superintendent of schools in
writing not later than sixty days immediately preceding the expiration
of his probationary period"'2 6 and that the teacher be given thirty days'
notice of a dismissal during the probationary period.,r
The current pressure on the employer to replace employees receiving
high salaries with less experienced and lower-paid personnel promises
to increase with the continuing rise in the cost of financing education.
Moreover, the rules with respect to teacher certification require that the
majority of teachers currently being hired obtain a master's degree or
thirty semester hours of graduate credits within five years after securing
their first (provisional) teaching certificate, if they wish to remain in
the profession.2 8 Paradoxically, because of the manner in which salary
scales are typically constructed, a teacher who obtains such a degree re-
ceives a substantial raise in pay; -'1 because decisions as to tenure will
now be made after the same five years, this pay increase perhaps lessens
his chances of obtaining tenure. He can of course work elsewhere, but
the economics of the marketplace are against him.
Given the extended length of the probationary period, the continuing
educational requirements, and the absence of any formal review of the
teacher's progress, the New York probationary teacher who has served
for a number of years may argue that he has an "expectancy" of re-
employment under the rationale of the Roth and Sindermann decisions.
The issue was specifically left open by Judge Kaufman in a recent Second
Circuit case,' 30 but the weaknesses of the argument must nevertheless
be recognized. Not the least of these is that Sindermann was employed
at a college which had no formal tenure system.'3 '
125. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 10-151(b) (1967); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3319.16
(Anderson 1972); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 11-1121 (1962); Tem. Educ. Code Ann. § 13.109
(1972).
126. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3012(2) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
127. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3019-a (McKinney 1970). The statute would be complied with
if a probationary teacher were informed on August 1 that he was not to be rehired on
September 1-the start of the school year. See Little v. Board of Educ., 42 App. Div. 2d 782,
346 N.Y.S.2d 575, 576 (2d Dep't 1973) (dissenting opinion).
128. 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § S0.15-.18 (1971). There are exceptions in the case of industrial arts
and similar subjects where provisional certificates have a ten-year life. Id. § 80.19-21.
129. See note 80 supra.
130. Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623, 628 n.6 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 932 (1973).
131. 408 U.S. at 602. For an example of a case in which the employee has successfully
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The tenuous position of the probationary teacher is perhaps best il-
lustrated by the situation described in Albaurm v. Carey. 2 The super-
intendent of schools refused to recommend that the board of education
grant tenure to Elvin Albaum, a probationary teacher. Albaum chal-
lenged the constitutionality of section 3012 (2) and sought a court order
to compel the superintendent to recommend him and the board of edu-
cation to consider him for tenure. The complaint alleged "that plaintiff-
a model teacher-was not granted tenure solely because he participated
in a teacher's union in a high level capacity."'8 3 Although counsel for the
state insisted that the right to deny tenure was not restricted in any
way, 3 4 a three-judge court held that the provisions of the federal and
state constitutions are to be read into the portion of section 3012 which
requires: "the superintendent of schools shall make a written report to
the board of education recommending for appointment on tenure those
persons who have been found competent, efficient and satisfactory."' as
Holding that the statutory language "refers to definite criteria enforce-
able in New York courts through an Article 78 proceeding,' 8x 0 the court
was able to uphold the constitutionality of the statute. However, it found
that plaintiff had not been denied tenure because of the exercise of any
of his constitutional or statutory rights and also concluded that plaintiff's
union activities had not contributed to the superintendent's decision. It de-
scribed Albaum as a "devoted, highly skilled, and imaginative teacher,"'"
but pointed out that "he had difficulties in developing new programs and
in carrying out school policies because of substantial and continuing
disagreements with administrators and supervisors."'"" The court con-
cluded that "[d] enial of tenure was caused by a desire on the part of...
the school superintendent to eliminate from the school system a nettle-
some individual who created annoying administrative problems."'8 9 Such
an individual is apparently not sufficiently "competent, efficient and sat-
isfactory" to be recommended for tenure.
While the three-judge court did not deal at length with the question,
raised the "expectancy of re-employment" argument see Zimmerer v. Spencer, 485 F.2d 176
(5th Cir. 1973). But see Skidmore v. Shamrock Ind. School Dist., 464 F.2d 605 (5th Cir.
1972).
132. 283 F. Supp. 3 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), dismissed, 310 F. Supp. 594 (E.D.N.Y. 1969)
(three-judge court).
133. 283 F. Supp. at S.
134. Id. at 6.
135. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3012(2) (McKinney 1970); see 310 F. Supp. at 595.
136. 310 F. Supp. at 595.





its opinion states that the Education Law contains definite criteria, en-
forceable in an article 78 proceeding, that place some statutory restraints
on the right of a superintendent to fire or, more accurately, to refuse to
recommend the granting of tenure. At least one New York state court has
supported the reasoning of the Albaum decision. In Tischler v. Board
of Education,4 ' petitioner brought an article 78 proceeding to compel
the board of education to grant her tenure, alleging that the board's fail-
ure to do so was an attempt to punish her for engaging in union activities.
In reversing the dismissal of the petition, the appellate division rea-
soned as follows:
The petitioner's appeal from the order entered upon that decision presents a ques-
tion as to the scope of the power of a board of education to deny tenure to a proba-
tionary teacher. Under the terms of subdivision 2 of section 3012 of the Education
Law, the Superintendent of Schools is required to recommend probationary teachers
for appointment on tenure at the end of their probationary term if he finds them
to be "competent, efficient and satisfactory". The Superintendent's recommendation is
a screening device which brings before the Board of Education all those who are
qualified by objective standards (Albaum v. Carey... ). The statute clearly contem-
plates that the recommendation be voted upon by the Board, but fails to prescribe
precise standards for the Board's action. Thus the Board is given broad discretion to
take into account the intangible subjective factors that are impossible to enumerate
but which are inherent in the choice of a permanent teaching staff for carrying on the
work of the school district. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that the Board's
discretion is boundless4 41
That is, although there is no statutory language limiting the discretion
of the board of education, that discretion is not without limit 4 2 and at
least the Tischler court suggested that the board's reason for acting must
in some way be related to the purpose of the probationary period or the
betterment of the educational system.
VIII. ATTEWMTED SOLUTIONS
A. Employer Action
For over twenty years the New York City Board of Education has
granted certain procedural rights to probationary teachers with respect to
"the discontinuance of service during the probationary term, or at the
expiration thereof."' 43 Section 105a of the Board's by-laws requires that
140. 37 App. Div. 2d 261, 323 N.Y.S.2d 503 (2d Dep't 1971). See generally Matter of
Marino, 11 N.Y. Educ. Dep't Rep. 336 (1972).
141. 37 App. Div. 2d at 263-64, 323 N.YS.2d at 512. See also McMaster v. Owens, 275
App. Div. 506, 509, 90 N.Y.S.2d 491,494 (3d Dep't 1949).
142. See text accompanying notes 100-05 supra.
143. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ. By-Laws § 105a (1964). See Brown v. Board of Educ., 42 App.
Div. 2d 702, 345 N.Y.S.2d 595 (2d Dep't 1973) (mem.).
For a description of other procedures which school districts might employ see Jacobsern
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the teacher receive written notice of the dismissal and have the oppor-
tunity to appear before the New York City Superintendent of Schools
or his designee to contest the dismissal. The employee can demand to
be confronted by witnesses, to call witnesses, and to introduce any rele-
vant evidence. While there is no right to be represented by an attorney,
the teacher can be "accompanied and advised" by a co-employee. Prior
to the decentralization law, a teacher who was informed that the city
Superintendent was recommending a denial of tenure would request a
review pursuant to section 105a; after such review, the Superintendent
would decide whether to rescind his original recommendation. Under the
decentralization law, however, the community superintendents and com-
munity school boards make tenure recommendations and grant tenure.
The current legal status of the section 105a procedure is therefore open
to serious question. 144 Nevertheless, for a considerable period of time, it
gave probationary New York City employees procedural due process pro-
tection not accorded to other teachers in the state.
B. Collective Bargaining
Teaching organizations throughout New York have attempted at the
bargaining table to regain the job security protection eliminated by the
1971 legislature, and in some instances have attempted to obtain job
security protection never accorded under the Education Law. While exist-
ing statutes limit the power to bargain with respect to certain issues,
there are some areas, clearly proper subjects of bargaining, in which
greater job protection might be negotiated for the probationary teacher.
In September of 1967, the New York State legislature enacted the Taylor
Law 45 to govern labor-management relations between public employees
on the one hand and the state, local governments, and other political sub-
divisions on the other. The law recognizes the "right" of public em-
ployees to organize, and states that "harmonious and cooperative rela-
tionships between government and its employees" are promoted by, inter
alia, "requiring the state, local governments and other political subdivi-
sions to negotiate with, and enter into written agreements with employee
organizations' 46 concerning salaries, wages, hours and other "terms and
Sperry & Jensen, The Dismissal and Non-Reemployment of Teachers, 1 J. Law. & Educ. 435,
446-48 (1972); Pettigrew & Howard, The Probationary Professor and the Constitution: A
Suggested Model Hearing Code for Contract Nonrenewal Cases, 8 Cal. W.L. Rev. 1, 62-72
(1971).
144. Rebell, New York's School Decentralization Law: Two and a Half Years Later, 2
J. Law & Educ. 1, 24-25 (1973).
145. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law §§ 200-14 (McKinney 1973).
146. Id. § 200.
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conditions of employment.""' Shortly after the passage of the law, the
Associated Teachers of Huntington negotiated the following provision
in its agreement with the Board of Education: "'Non-tenure teachers
will be notified of termination of employment not later than March 1st,
except that for the third year, the teacher will be notified not later than
January 1.' "148 The agreement also contained a clause which called for
the arbitration of grievances and defined "grievance" as "'a claim which
involves the interpretation and application of the terms and provisions
of [the] contract.' ""'
The Board had sent a notice of termination to a first-year teacher two
months after the time required by the contract. The teachers' associa-
tion instituted grievance proceedings, finally invoking the compulsory
arbitration provisions of the agreement. In denying the Board's motion
to stay arbitration, the court held that since there was no "unquestionable
exclusion from arbitration" the decision as to arbitrability was to be
resolved in arbitration and not in a court; 15 0 the holding was consistent
with the rule laid down by the New York Court of Appeals in Long
Island Lumber Co. v. Martin.'5' In seeking to avoid arbitration, the
Board argued that the notice of termination provision for non-tenured
teachers, even though freely agreed to, was void. The Huntington court
noted that the Education Law provided that persons not recommended
for tenure be notified "not later than sixty days immediately preceding
the expiration of [the] probationary period"' 2 and ruled that there was
nothing to prevent the Board from agreeing to a more liberal notice
policy'- 3 Under the present statute, a teaching employee is entitled to
sixty days' notice if the superintendent is not recommending him for
tenure at the end of the five-year probationary period.5 Prior thereto, a
probationary teacher may be dismissed with thirty days' notice, even in
the middle of the school year. 5 In this respect, the New York law is
147. Id. § 203.
148. Associated Teachers (Huntington) v. Board of Educ., 60 Misc. 2d 443, 444, 303
N.Y.S.2d 469, 470 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (at the time the agreement was negotiated, the proba-
tionary period was three years). This case is not to be confused with the case cited in note
159 infra. The instant case will occasionally be referred to as "Huntington," and the latter
as "the court of appeals Huntington case."
149. Id. at 443, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
150. Id. at 445, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
151. 15 N.Y.2d 380, 207 N.E.2d 190, 259 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1965). See N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law
209 (McKinney 1973).
152. 60 Misc. 2d at 446, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 472 (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 446-47, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 473.
154. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3012(2) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
155. Id. § 3019-a (McKinney 1970).
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harsher than that in most other states.'56 Moreover, since most school
jobs are filled on a September-June basis, the difficulty in finding employ-
ment if one is fired in November is patent.'5
The effect of the notice provision negotiated in the Huntington case is
salutary in a number of respects. It provides somewhat more reasonable
notice for the teacher whose employment is to be terminated. Signifi-
cantly, the Huntington agreement provided for a longer notice period
for those teachers with greater seniority. This distinction is a sensible
one, particularly in today's market when the experienced, and therefore
more highly paid, employee may have greater difficulty in obtaining
other employment.
The notice provisions may result in added difficulties in the preparation
of the school district budget which (at least in most school districts out-
side New York City) is submitted to the voters between May and July,
but these difficulties should not provide insurmountable problems for a
board of education.
The Huntington case involved a first year teacher. If the arbitrator
were to find in favor of the teacher, the appropriate relief would at best
be to compel the board to rehire the teacher for the following school year.
The position of this teacher as of the following September-the second
year of his probationary period-is not at all clear. Perhaps he could be
dismissed without notice, although the teachers' association would un-
doubtedly argue that such an interpretation would render the notice pro-
vision meaningless.
A more difficult question would be presented if the employee in ques-
tion were in the final year of the probationary period. The granting of
tenure would appear to be the only remedy that would afford complete
relief. On the other hand, such relief would constitute a method of avoid-
ing the five-year probationary period recently written into the law."5 8
156. E.g., Cal. Educ. Code § 13442 (West 1969); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 10-151(a)
(Supp. 1973); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3319.16 (Anderson 1972); Tex. Educ. Code Ann.
§ 13.103 (1972).
157. See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 282, 286 (8th Cir. 1972). Furthermore,
school districts in New York are not required to join the state unemployment compensation
system; and in this respect, at least, a public school teacher is in a poorer position than most
employees in the private sector. See N.Y. Labor Law § 560(4) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
158. The decisions are not conclusive. See Hauppauge Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Mill-
man, 35 App. Div. 2d 844, 317 N.Y.S.2d 461 (2d Dep't 1970), where the court noted that
failure to observe and evaluate a probationary teacher in accordance with the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement conferred no rights with regard to tenure. Some arbi-
trators have reached different conclusions in similar cases. See N.Y. Teacher, Dec. 2, 1973,
at 4, col. 1; id. at 28, col. 1; id., Oct. 7, 1973, at 27, col. 1; id., Sept. 16, 1973, at 21, col. 1;
id., May 20, 1973, at 7, col. 1. Cf. Shumate v. Board of Educ., 478 F.2d 233 (4th Cir. 1973)
(per curiam); City of Albany v. Helsby, 29 N.Y.2d 433, 278 N.E.2d 898, 328 N.Y.S.2d 658
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Teacher organizations in fact have attempted to shorten the proba-
tionary period through collective bargaining; and while the validity of
such a contractual provision has not been specifically passed on, various
court of appeals' decisions strongly suggest its validity. In Board of Ed-
ucation v. Associated Teachers (Huntington),5 9 the court specifically
upheld the legality of longer notice provisions and various other portions
of the negotiated agreement.
Chief judge Fuld, writing for the majority, set out the applicable prin-
ciples as follows:
[T]he validity of a provision found in a collective agreement negotiated by a public
employer turns upon whether it constitutes a term or condition of employment. If it
does, then, the public employer must negotiate as to such term or condition and, upon
reaching an understanding, must incorporate it into the collective agreement unless
some statutory provision circumscribes its power to do so.16°
The length of time that an employee must serve satisfactorily before ob-
taining additional job security is a term and condition of his employment,
and the presumption thus exists that boards of education may legally
negotiate with respect to the question.
Public employers must, therefore, be presumed to possess the broad powers needed
to negotiate with employees as to all terms and conditions of employment. The pre-
sumption may, of course, be rebutted by showing statutory provisions which expressly
prohibit collective bargaining as to a particular term or condition but, "[i~n the ab-
sence of an express legislative restriction against bargaining for that term of an em-
ployment contract between a public employer and its employees, the authority to
provide for such [term] resides in the [school board] under the broad powers and
duties delegated by the statutes."16'
Section 3012 of the Education Law, which provides for appointment
on tenure "[a]t the expiration of the probationary term,""' arguably is
(1972). But see Legislative Conf. of the City Univ. v. Board of Higher Educ., 38 App. Div.
2d 478, 330 N.Y.S.2d 688 (lst Dep't), aft'd, 31 N.Y.2d 926, 293 N.E2d 92, 340 N.YS.d
924 (1972), where the court refused to confirm an arbitrator's award directing the granting
of tenure. The court found that the arbitrator had exceeded the power granted to him in the
negotiated agreement, and also concluded that the state constitution required the same
result. See also Board of Educ. v. Chautauqua Cent. School Teachers Ass'n, 41 App. Div.
2d 47, 341 N.Y.S.2d 690 (4th Dep't 1973).
159. 30 N.Y.2d 122, 282 N.E.2d 109, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1972), modifying and alFg 36
App. Div. 2d 753, 319 N.Y.S.2d 469 (2d Dep't 1971), modifying and al~g 62 Misc. 2d 906,
310 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup. Ct 1970). This case has nothing to do with the Huntington case dis-
cussed at notes 148-53 supra and accompanying text.
160. 30 N.Y.2d at 127, 282 N.E.2d at 112, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
161. Id. at 130, 282 N.E.2d at 113, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 23 (quoting the appellate division
opinion in Teachers Ass'n (Nassau) v. Board of Educ., 34 App. Div. 2d 351, 355, 312
N.Y.S.2d 252, 256 (2d Dep't 1970)).
162. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3012(2) (McKinney Supp. 1973) (emphasis added).
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such a restriction; but in Weinbrown v. Board of Education'0 8 the court
of appeals held that in spite of its language, section 3012 "does not for-
bid the offer of an appointment to tenure prior to the expiration of the
probationary period."'0 4 Moreover, assuming the requisite acceptance,
the conferral of tenure will be effective and may not be revoked.'
The Weinbrown case involved a teacher who had virtually completed
his probationary period. The board had informed petitioner of his tenure
appointment and given him notice of the projected salary schedule for
the following school year. Petitioner signed an acceptance, thereby in-
dicating his willingness to return in September. The board of education,
following a practice that has become typical, had made its tenure decision
during the preceding spring. Whether the court would have applied the
same reasoning if the offer of tenure were made a year before the end of
the probationary period has been questioned by the state education de-
partment.0 0 On its face, however, the Weinbrown case establishes the
principle that it is legal for a board of education to make binding tenure
decisions prior to the end of a teacher's probationary period. Given the
Weinbrown decision and the reasoning in the court of appeals Hunting-
ton case, there would appear to be no reason why a board of education
could not contractually bind itself to make tenure decisions prior to the
end of the probationary period.
The present contract between the New York City Board of Education
and the United Federation of Teachers provides:
Teachers on probation who have completed at least three years of service on regular
appointment in the school shall be entitled, with the [sic] respect to the discontinuance
of their probationary service, to the same review procedures as are established for
tenured teachers under section 2590 j 7 of the Education Law.' 0 7
While the contract stops short of saying that these probationary teachers
are tenured, the board agrees to give such teachers the job security pro-
tection given to tenured members of the staff. The effect is the same-
no teacher may be fired without good cause.10 8
At least one lower court decision subsequent to Weinbrown has held
that it is beyond the power of a board of education "to reduce the statu-
tory time period [for tenure] substantially below the new five-year
163. 28 N.Y.2d 474, 271 N.E.2d 549, 322 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1971).
164. Id. at 476, 271 N.E.2d at 551, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 715.
165. Id. at 477, 271 N.E.2d at 551, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
166. N.Y. Educ. Dep't Formal Op. of Counsel No. 229 (July 7, 1971).
167. 168 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 15, 1972, at 2, col. 8.
168. N.Y. Educ. Law § 2590-j(7) (McKinney 1970) sets out the reasons for which
tenured employees in New York City may be dismissed, and the review procedures which,
inter alia, permit arbitration.
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period." 169 That court read Weinbrown as permitting an offer of tenure
at some reasonable time prior to the expiration of the probationary period,
but found that an agreement granting tenure protection after three years
was beyond the power of the board of education. The court seemed to
give insufficient effect to the court of appeals decision in the Huntington
case, which requires a board of education to bargain with respect to all
terms and conditions of employment "unless some statutory provision
circumscribes its power to do so."1'0 Weinbrown holds that a board may
make an offer of tenure prior to the expiration of the probationary period.
A provision of the Education Law provides a rationale for that deci-
sion, 71 and no statutory provision specifically forbids an earlier tenure
award. Moreover, the policy of the Taylor Law to promote negotiation
as to terms and conditions of employment provides an additional reason
to permit negotiation.72 As long as the item being discussed is a term or
condition of employment the board is presumed to possess the authority
to negotiate, 173 and there is "no reason why the mandatory provision of
[the Taylor Law] should be limited, in any way, except in cases where
some other applicable statutory provision explicitly and definitively pro-
hibits the public employer from making an agreement as to a particular
term or condition of employment." 74
There is of course a basic problem with the use of the ad hoc labor
negotiations approach to remedy the problems faced by the probationary
teacher. Assuming that the Weinbrow= case and court of appeals Hunt-
ington case permit negotiated agreements such as that arrived at in New
York City, not every union will be willing or able to obtain a similar
provision in its agreement' 15 It is axiomatic that if such a provision is
169. Board of Educ. v. Byram Hills Teachers' Ass'n, 74 MIsc. 2d 621, 623, 345 N.Y.S.2d
302, 304 (Sup. Ct. 1973). See also Legislative Conf. of the City Univ. v. Board of Higher
Educ., 38 App. Div. 2d 478, 330 N.Y.S.2d 688 (1st Dep't 1972) (wherein the court con-
cluded that an arbitrator could not award tenure) ; Mulholland v. Board of Educ., 70 Misc.
2d 852, 334 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1972), aft'd, 41 App. Div. 2d 704, 340 N.Y.S2d 1014
(2d Dep't 1973) (mem.) (narrow reading given to the Weinbrown decision).
170. 30 N.Y.2d at 127, 282 N.E.2d at 112, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
171. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3012(2) (McKinney Supp. 1973) requires that a person who is
not to be recommended for tenure be notified at least 60 days before the end of the proba-
tionary period.
172. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law §§ 200, 203 (McKinney 1973).
173. Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers (Huntington), 30 N.Y.2d 122, 130, 282
N.E.2d 109, 113, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17, 23 (1972).
174. Id. at 129, 282 N.E.2d at 113, 331 N.YS.2d at 23.
175. Tom Hobart, President of the New York State United Teachers, noted that "all too
few local teacher organizations have been able to ... negotiate a probationary period that was




to be included in a collective bargaining agreement, it must be proposed
by a teachers' organization and agreed to by a board of education. Such a
provision benefits only a portion of the collective bargaining unit-that
portion with the least seniority and, consequently, the least power in the
union structure. Moreover, the provision impinges on an important "man-
agement prerogative"--the right to fire for cause. Given the present edu-
cational structure, it would be opposed by many superintendents of
schools and boards of education. Whether teachers' unions in general
possess the bargaining ability, the desire, and the power to obtain such a
provision is open to question.
In the final analysis, the Taylor Law permits the employer to deter-
mine terms and conditions of employment. The law requires good faith
collective bargaining17 6 and contains mediation and fact-finding pro-
cedures for the resolution of negotiation impasses. 77 If these and similar
procedures do not result in an agreement, however, the final step in the
procedure is a legislative hearing at which the parties explain their posi-
tion with respect to the fact-finding report.178 In the case of a teachers'
union and a school district, the hearing occurs before the board of educa-
tion. The parties before the board are the teachers' organization and the
superintendent of schools or his designee. After the hearing, the board is
empowered to "take such action as it deems to be in the public interest,
including the interest of the public employees involved."' 70 In short, the
board of education, which throughout the negotiating process has at the
very least been giving instructions to its negotiators, is the final arbiter.
Given the statutory provisions for the resolution of impasses, the illegality
of strikes in the public sector,8 0 and the penalities that can be imposed
in the event of a strike, 8' it is doubtful that many teachers' organiza-
tions would resort to a strike for a provision which will benefit only a
small portion of the membership.
C. Legislative Proposals
Thus, it appears that there are some statewide legislative changes that
should be made. Initially, the probationary period itself should be short-
ened to three years,'82 the period that existed prior to the 1971 change in
176. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 209-a (McKinney 1973).
177. Id. § 209.
178. Id.
179. Id. § 209(3) (e) (iv).
180. Id. § 210.
181. Id.
182. Such a bill has been introduced in the state legislature. N.Y. Sen. bill 4910 & N.Y.
Assembly bill 3096, 196th Sess. (1973). In addition, Governor Wilson has recently come out
in favor of a reduction of the tenure period to three years. In an address before a teachers'
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the law. Although the present five-year probationary period may be at-
tractive for monetary reasons or administrative convenience, it is difficult
to understand what additional qualifications or defects management can
discover during the extra two years to assist in its tenure decision; three
full-time teaching years in the same school system should suffice. More-
over, postponement of the tenure decision beyond three years is unfair
to the employee. Finally, it invites management to postpone difficult deci-
sions, thereby permitting some inferior teachers to continue teaching be-
yond the time when they should have been dismissed.
During the probationary period-at least after the first year of em-
ployment-it should not be possible to dismiss a probationary teacherlns
other than at the end of the school year, without cause and without pro-
viding the employee an opportunity to contest the dismissal. Such an
opportunity exists in many jurisdictions.184 The procedure currently ap
plicable to the dismissal of tenured teachers could be utilized,"e but a
less formal procedure might also be considered. Such a provision should
not prevent a reduction in staff due to lowered enrollment or other similar
reasons causing an elimination of teaching positions.
In addition, the legislature should enact a statute, much like the present
federal Civil Service regulations, to provide that all decisions not to
rehire probationary teachers shall be solely for the improvement of the
education system. 86 A probationary teacher who is not rehired should
be permitted to test the following issues before the Commissioner of Edu-
cation or his designee:
(1) whether the stated reason for nonretention was the actual rea-
son;'8 7 (2) the good faith of the employer; and (3) whether the stated
reason, if true, is for "the improvement of the education system."
The employee, in contesting his dismissal, would follow the normal rules
meeting, the Governor stated that "[i]f a superintendent of schools can't make [a tenure]
decision in three years . . . [wie ought to take a look at the superintendent." N.Y. Times,
Mar. 23, 1974, at 64, col. 1.
183. Special problems will be raised by the teacher hired after the start of the school
year. The protections noted below should not apply to such an employee until he has
completed a full year.
184. E.g., Cal. Educ. Code § 13443 (West Supp. 1974); Md. Ann. Code arL 77, § 114
(1969) ; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3319.16 (Anderson 1972); Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 13.112
(1972).
185. See notes 195-204 infra and accompanying text.
186. See 5 C.F.R. § 752.104(a) (1973).
187. Section 3031 of the Education Law should be amended to require that all boards
of education inform the employee of the reason for his nonretention. The law currently does
not apply to New York City. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3031 (MeKinney Supp. 1973).
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for filing a petition before the Commissioner of Education;1 8 thus, he
would be required to file such a petition within thirty days after receiving
notice of nonretention.'8 9 No written answer would be required from the
employer unless the Commissioner concluded that the complaint of the
employee and the evidence furnished therewith (affidavits, documents,
etc.) proved a prima facie case. 10 The Commissioner could at any time
ask either party for additional information and could schedule a hearing
if he believed it necessary to reach a decision.
The issues before the Commissioner would be quite limited. As long as
the employer's judgment was made in good faith and the reasons for non-
retention were related to the improvement of the educational system,1 'l
the employer's action would not be upset by the Commissioner.0 2 Such a
188. See S N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 275.1 et seq. (1969).
189. Id. § 275.16. Section 3012 of the Education Law should be amended to require that
notice of nonretention be given at least 60 days before the end of the school year. That
section currently requires that 60 days notice be given to a probationary teacher who Is
not being recommended for tenure. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3012(2) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
Ohio requires that a probationary teacher be notified on or before April 30 if the employing
board does not intend to re-employ him during the following school year. Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 3319.11 (Anderson 1972).
190. This represents a change in the normal procedures of the Commissioner. See 8
N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 275.10-.13 (1969). The intent would be to discourage frivolous petitions
and to require some evidentiary showing by the employee before the employer is required
to answer. Hearings would not be required in most situations. Written briefs should be suf-
ficient to determine whether the stated reason relates to the improvement of the educational
system. In most cases, a good faith employer should be able to submit sufficient written
information (evaluations, affidavits, documentary records) to show that his action was bona
fide. Moreover, the Commissioner should insist on specific and detailed proof by the em-
ployee before he requires any answer by the employer. Such an approach should stream-
line the procedure and discourage unmeritorious petitions.
191. The reason for nonretention could involve the improper conduct of the employee,
such as his failure to report for work on time, excessive absences, or unwillingness to follow
the direction of his employer. Such reasons would often constitute sufficient cause for the
dismissal of a teacher during the school year. Other reasons might not justify dismissal during
the year, but would merely involve a judgment by the employer that he could improve the
quality of education by hiring a different employee for the following year. Such judgments
might relate to the employee's teaching ability, involving concerns which are more clearly
tied to the educational process itself-for example, his relationship with students, his actual
performance in the classroom, his interest in his job-or could involve behavior of the
teacher outside the classroom. See Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973). For a
further listing of factors that can properly be considered see Simard v. Board of Educ., 473
F.2d 988, 991-92 (2d Cir. 1973); Local 1600, AFT v. Byrd, 456 F.2d 882, 886 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1973).
192. The good faith of the employer would be open to serious question if the decision
not to retain a teacher were wholly unsupported in fact. But cf. Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
Section 310 of the New York Education Law provides that decisions of the Commissioner
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procedure would enable the nonretained teacher to test the good faith
of the employer before a third party-a member of the education estab-
lishment not directly involved at the local level-while at the same time
preserving the right of the local board to fire for any reason related to the
improvement of the education system, and avoiding lengthy hearings on
each occasion of a probationary teacher's nonretention. 19 3
IX. TnE PROTECTION OF TENURE
Once a teacher has achieved tenure, he may not be removed except
"for neglect of duty, incapacity to teach, immoral conduct, or other rea-
son which, when appealed to the commissioner of education, shall be
held by him sufficient cause for such dismissal." 94 The Education Law
likewise provides a detailed procedure which must be followed in order
to dismiss a tenured teacher. 195 Written charges must be filed with the
clerk of the school district who "shall immediately notify" the board of
education of the charges.9 0 The board is required to meet in executive
session and decide within five days whether probable cause exists for
the charges.197 If the board makes such a finding "a written statement
specifying the charges in detail, and outlining his rights" under the sec-
"shall be final and conclusive, and not subject to question or review in any place or court
whatever." N.Y. Educ. Law § 310 (McKinney 1969). In teacher tenure situations, the courts
have ruled that determinations of the Commissioner are final unless they are purely arbitrary.
Walsh v. Nyquist, 37 App. Div. 2d 869, 325 N.Y.S.2d 103 (3d Dep't 1971); Lubell v. Ny-
quist, 31 App. Div. 2d 569, 294 N.Y.S.2d 961 (3d Dep't 1968), motion for leave to appeal
denied, 23 N.Y.2d 645, 298 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1969); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 60 Misc. 2d
967, 304 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sup. CL 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 36 App. Div. 2d 199, 319
N.Y.S.2d 661 (3d Dep't 1971). See generally Wood v. United States Post Office, 472 F.2d
96, 99 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
193. See Thaw v. Board of Pub. Instruct., 432 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1970) wherein the court
stated: "It would be too much to ask the school board to hold a hearing every time it de-
termines not to renew the contract of a probationary teacher, or even every time a terminated
teacher requests a hearing without alleging unconstitutional action." Id. at 100 (emphasis
omitted). The proposal will of course require an increase in the size of the staff of the
Commissioner. It may, however, be most practical for the department to maintain a panel
of qualified "bearing examiners" to decide such questions.
194. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3020 (McKinney 1970).
195. Id. § 3020-a (McKinney Supp. 1973). A federal three-judge panel in New York
recently declared section 3020-a unconstitutional because it denies teachers adequate due
process; specifically, the court would require the board in question to set forth the reasons
for its final decision in any dismissal proceeding brought under the section, particularly when
it chooses not to accept the recommendations of the bearing panel. Kinsella v. Board of
Educ., Civil No. 73-187 (W.D.N.Y., Feb. 19, 1974). See text accompanying notes 196-204
infra for administrative details of a section 3020-a proceeding.
196. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3020-a(2) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
197. Id. Such a finding requires "a vote of a majority of all the members of such
board." Id.
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tion must immediately be forwarded to the accused employee by certified
mail.198
Absent a waiver by the employee, the Commissioner of Education is
notified and is required to schedule a hearing within twenty working
days in the local school district or the county seat.10 The hearing, which
takes place before a three-member panel, is governed by rules and pro-
cedures of the Commissioner, but the statute specifically provides that
the technical rules of evidence do not apply; it grants each party the
right to be represented by counsel and to subpoena and cross-examine
witnesses. The Commissioner is required to designate a hearing officer.
All testimony is taken under oath. A transcript of the proceedings, which
may be in public or private at the discretion of the employee, is also
mandated.200 Perhaps in an overabundance of caution, the statute pro-
vides that "[t]he employee shall have a reasonable opportunity to defend
himself and an opportunity to testify in his own behalf."120
The findings and the recommendations of the hearing panel must be
forwarded to the employee and the clerk of the employing board within
five days. The panel similarly is required to make a recommendation as
to the appropriate penalty if it believes one is warranted. Possible penal-
ties include reprimand, fine, suspension for a fixed time without pay, or
dismissal. The employing board has thirty days after receipt of the re-
port to "determine the case . . . and fix the penalty or punishment, If
any .. . The board is, in short, free to ignore the recommendations
of the hearing panel, 20 but such action will of course be taken into ac-
count by any appellate body reviewing the matter.
An employee who wishes to challenge an adverse determination of his
employing board may either appeal to the Commissioner of Education
or commence a special proceeding under article 78 of the CPLR.0 4
As indicated earlier, there has been a great deal of criticism of the
tenure system in recent years." 5 The review procedure appears unduly
198. Id.
199. Id. § 3020-a(3) (a).
200. Id. § 3020-a(3)(c) (McKinney 1970).
201. Id.
202. Id. § 3020-a(4) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
203. Le Tarte v. Board of Educ., 65 Misc. 2d 147, 316 N.Y.S.2d 781 (Sup. Ct. 1970);
In re Wiles, 11 N.Y. Educ. Dep't Rep. 69 (1971). But see Kinsella v. Board of tduc., Civil
No. 73-187 (W.D.N.Y., Feb. 19, 1974), wherein the court declared that a section 3020-a
proceeding was unconstitutional absent a requirement that the board decision be based upon
evidence elicited before the hearing panel; furthermore, the board must set forth the reasons
and factual bases for its decision. The case and its background are discussed in N.Y. Teacher,
Mar. 3, 1974, at 1, col. 3.
204. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3020-a(S) (McKinney 1970).
205. See note 17 supra and accompanying text concerning comments and proposals of the
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cumbersome, at least in those cases where it is clear from the outset that
a minimal penalty is involved. While an official reprimand may serve a
salutary purpose, the possibility of having to sustain it in the appellate
courts is a strong incentive for the employer to do nothing.
The process of disciplining a tenured teacher is time-consuming and
typically requires the effort of counsel, the superintendent of schools,
and several school management personnel. It calls for serious discussion
by the board of education and management personnel, and raises the
possibility that various upper-echelon school employees will be required
to testify before the hearing panel. It further requires that management
sustain its position before the Commissioner or the court. The time and
effort required, and the lack of success experienced in many dismissal
cases, make it understandable that the process is seldom used to dismiss
or otherwise discipline a teacher for doing a poor job in the classroom.e
Some argue that tenure should therefore be abolished or probationary
periods extended. Others suggest that no change need be made because
a method already exists to remove inferior teachers; if nothing is done,
management is at fault and the teacher-employee should not suffer be-
cause of management's reluctance or incompetence. Both arguments have
a certain simplistic appeal but, in the writer's view, both miss the mark.
The teacher should have job security; in fact, its existence may often
make him a better teacher. On the other hand, the present tenure system
makes it difficult to eliminate the poor teacher and does not permit any
action against the teacher who simply does the minimum without other-
wise exerting himself. In fact, once a teacher has tenure, there may be
little reason to evaluate his performance thoroughly, except when he is
considered for promotion. In short, under the present system, absent
complaints by parents or other staff members, management has little
built-in incentive to improve the performance of the teacher who is
doing a poor job.
New York State School Boards Association. In addition, the New York State United Teachers
Association proposes to extend tenure protection to all teachers. N.Y. Teacher, Jan. 27, 1974,
at 8, col. 3.
206. For example, for the 1970-71 and 1971-72 school years, only 66 proceedings to dis-
cipline tenured teachers were initiated by boards of education outside the cities of New York
and Buffalo. Weisberger, Job Security and Public Employees 15 n.6 (IPE Monograph No.
2, Mar. 1973). Some of the proceedings had nothing to do with the job being done in
the classroom. See, e.g., In re Westerling, 11 N.Y. Educ. Dep't Rep. 251 (1972); In re
Cerreta, 11 N.Y. Educ. Dep't Rep. 131 (1971). Even where the Commissioner or the court
agrees with the factual findings of the employing board, a reduction of the penalty is often
granted. See, e.g., Marcato v. Board of Educ., 40 App. Div. 2d 978, 338 N.YS.2d 209 (2d
Dep't 1972); Clayton v. Clement, 40 App. Div. 2d 827, 337 N.Y.S.2d 374 (2d Dep't 1972)
(mem.); Walsh v. Nyquist, 37 App. Div. 2d 869, 325 N.Y3.2d 103 (3d Dep't 1971).
1974]
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X. TOWARDS A MERIT PAY SYSTEM
Perhaps a certain number of incompetents will always be with us.
Clearly, there will always be differences in job performance among
teachers. One must ask whether all teachers, simply because they have
the same experience and educational background, should automatically
receive the same salary. Perhaps merit pay in education is an idea whose
time has come. In addition to rewarding good performance, a proper merit
pay system would force management to evaluate performance on a con-
tinual basis and to be more concerned with this aspect of its own super-
visory function.
It is easy to agree in theory that the better teacher should receive
more money, but drafting a specific merit pay system acceptable to
teachers and boards of education is a difficult and complicated task.20 7
The legislature could of course mandate a specific plan, but the imple-
mentation of such legislation in any given school district should be de-
layed until teachers and management have had sufficient opportunity to
negotiate their own agreement. Nevertheless, the governor and the legis-
lature should put the parties on notice that, in the absence of significant
progress, the state will impose its own plan unless and until the parties
themselves agree on a mutually satisfactory system. Such a system
would force management to determine exactly who the better teachers
are and would prevent the mediocre teacher, who cannot and perhaps
should not be fired, from obtaining periodic automatic pay increases
equal to those of his more proficient colleagues. 08
Any future legislation should permit the parties to negotiate the pro-
cedures for determining the employees who will receive merit pay, the
amount of the award, and all other details of the plan. The parties may,
for example, decide that the entire teaching staff should be eligible to
receive merit pay, that the plan should cover only tenured employees,
that the merit pay amount should vary, that all employees should be
compensated for increases in the cost of living, or that certain employees
should receive no pay increase whatsoever. In short, any legislation should
207. An April, 1970 publication of the New York State Teachers Association quoted with
approval the following conclusion from the 1957 Report of the Special Committee on Merit
Payments: "The study has revealed no plan for varying salaries of teachers with the same
responsibilities according to a rating scale, or other means of evaluating competence, which
the Committee can recommend." N.Y. State Teachers Ass'n, Salary Schedule Provisions for
Nonautomatic Increments at v (1970).
208. The so-called minimum salary law which mandated minimum wage increases for
all teachers during the first ten years of employment was repealed in 1971. Law of Apr. 12,
1971, ch. 123, § 1, [1971] N.Y. Laws 194th Sess. 715, repealing N.Y. Educ. Law § 3604(1)
(McKinney 1970) (codified at N.Y. Educ. Law § 3604 (McKinney Supp. 1973)).
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permit the widest possible discretion in negotiating the content of a merit
pay system, but some kind of merit system should be required. In point
of fact, various school districts in New York State have negotiated merit
pay plans with their employees.2 0 9 The parties, perforce, have decided
many of the questions mentioned, including the issue of who is to deter-
mine the merit pay recipients and the standards to be applied in making
that decision.
Teachers understandably approach the idea of merit pay with caution.
The mechanics of the plan are not easy to formulate. Clearly, merit pay
should not be used as a means for the employer to save money. Rather,
it should seek to achieve a wiser distribution of the funds that are avail-
able. The amount of the award should be sufficient to provide an incen-
tive, but it is not necessary (and probably not initially desirable) that all
wage increases be based on merit. Moreover, the total monetary package
should continue to be a matter for negotiation between the parties.
Both teachers and boards of education have a stake in ensuring that
those who do the job obtain a fair share of the available education dollar.
The emergence of a merit pay system should have several other benefi-
cial effects. It should eliminate some of the disadvantages of the tenure
system while at the same time continuing job security for the tenured
employee. Although it may still be difficult to rid a school system of an
incompetent teacher, such an employee will not necessarily receive the
same wage increases as other employees. Since school boards would no
longer be compelled to pay the mediocre tenured employee an ever-
increasing salary, it should also be easier to achieve more job security
for the probationary teacher, who at present is altogether too vulnerable
to arbitrary action on the part of the employer. It may in fact be appro-
priate to suggest that boards of education grant increased protections
to the probationary teacher in return for a merit pay system.
Boards must be sensitive to teacher fears of arbitrariness, must be
willing to provide for teacher input in the decision-making process, and
must recognize that fair administration of the plan is essential. Such
a system should encourage both teachers and management to give more
attention to improving the quality of teaching, which is, after all, the
principal goal.
209. 4 N.Y. PERB Bulletin for Mediators/Fact Finders No. 4 (May 1973) lists the follow-
ing school districts: Gates-Chili (Monroe County-418 teachers) ; Pittsford (Monroe County
-400 teachers) ; Greece (Monroe County-690 teachers) ; Niskayuna (Schenectady County-
301 teachers); Campbell (Steuben County-33 teachers); Hammondsport (Steuben County
-70 teachers); Jamesville-DeWitt (Onondaga County-288 teachers); New Hartford
(Oneida County-247 teachers). See generally N.Y. State School Bds. Ass'n, Evaluation and
Merit Pay Clinics (1973), concerning guidelines for and alternative approaches to establish-
ing merit pay systems.
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